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1. Introduction
Cases of severe food contamination and the mad cow 
crisis of the 1990s have driven interventionist policies 
and many private regulations aimed at ensuring food 
quality and safety (Fulponi, 2006; Hobbs, 2004; Krieger 
and Schiefer, 2007; Trienekens and Zuurbier, 2008). 
The institutional environment has changed with the 
introduction of new technical regulations and other food 
safety mechanisms. These changes have led to an increase 
in investment in specific assets associated with the need 
for better coordination, alignment of strategies and 
redesign of contractual arrangements between agents of 
the production chain. As a result, different strategies and 
contractual arrangements designed for different markets 
now coexist (Mondelli and Zylbersztajn, 2008a; Zylbersztajn 
and Machado Filho, 2003). The spot market is no longer 
the only form of governance for transactions between cattle 
farmers and meat processing plants in Brazil. Forward 
contracts and relational contracts – which are classified 
as hybrid forms of governance, according to the heuristic 
model developed by Williamson (1985) – are now used 
in transactions between meat processing plants and cattle 
farmers in Brazil.
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is a helpful theoretical 
approach for understanding the reasons behind the 
appearance and adaptation of different organizational 
arrangements in agriculture. It supports the proposition that 
modes of governance are aligned with transaction attributes, 
such as: specificity of the assets involved, the uncertainty 
to which the transactions are subject and the frequency 
with which the transactions are conducted. This alignment 
minimizes transaction costs (Williamson, 1985, 1991). The 
objective of this article is to identify whether these attributes 
determine the adoption of hybrid forms in transactions 
of finished cattle between farmers and slaughterhouses 
in the Brazilian state of São Paulo. Besides its academic 
importance, this study has management implications. 
Coordination has become a strategic issue for accessing 
new market opportunities for the Brazilian beef industry, 
which exports 18% of its production (MAPA, 2013). The 
results can assist both farmers and slaughterhouses in 
effective organizational design for specific markets. For 
the investigation, data were collected from a sample of 84 
producers located in the state of São Paulo, which were 
analysed using a dichotomous choice model, known as the 
logit model. The following sections present the theoretical 
framework, the description of governance structures in 
finished cattle transactions in Brazil, the hypotheses 
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regarding the determinants for adopting hybrid forms of 
governance, the methodology and the results.
2. Theoretical framework
TCE was used to support the analysis presented in this 
article. This approach makes an important contribution to 
the research on inter-organizational arrangements within 
the supply chain (Halldorsson et al., 2007) and has been 
used in empirical studies that focus on transactions between 
agents of supply chains (Boger et al., 2001; Hobbs and 
Young, 2000). In contrast to neoclassical microeconomic 
theory, TCE assumes that markets do not work exclusively 
through the price mechanism. There are costs involved in 
using the price mechanism that justify the existence of other 
modes of organizing economic transactions (Coase, 1937). 
The choice of the coordination mechanism depends on 
the cost of discovering current market prices (collection of 
information), the cost of negotiating and drafting contracts, 
and the cost of ensuring compliance with the terms of the 
contract. These costs are called transaction costs.
Agents should adopt governance structures that enable them 
to reduce transaction costs (North, 1992). There are changes 
to the institutional, technological or economic environment 
for which the pricing system can convey all the relevant 
information and are sufficient to induce the adaptation of 
the agents. Other changes require coordinated responses 
between the agents and involve more complex contractual 
arrangements (Williamson, 1991). Williamson (1985) 
identified three basic forms of coordinating transactions, 
also called governance structures:
•	 Spot market: market exchange is an adapted form of 
nonspecific transaction, where there is no continuity in 
the relationship. In this mechanism, the evaluation of 
the relationship by the parties is based on their own 
experience. It is the structure that best approximates the 
neoclassical theoretical framework of pure competition.
•	 Hybrid forms: given the specificity of the assets and 
the recurring nature of the transactions, credible 
commitments are created and relationships of trust 
can be built. Formal and informal contracts work as a 
framework, since the agents are inclined to establish and 
comply with their clauses.
•	 Vertical integration: coordination necessary for regular 
transactions and in the presence of highly specific assets. 
In this structure, the transactions between agents are 
brought into the hierarchy of the firm.
The emphasis placed by Williamson (1985) on the analysis 
of coordination mechanisms uncovered hybrid structures, 
which lie somewhere between the market and the hierarchy. 
Ménard (2004) stressed the need to develop a theory that 
explains these modes of organization, in which the agents 
are independent of each other, but work together in some 
type of business. In arrangements of this type, the agents can 
share technological knowledge, capital, products or services, 
without, however, internalizing the activities within a single 
firm. The influence of price mechanisms is lower than in 
the spot market. Regardless of its format, the coordination 
of activities is based on cooperation between the parties 
and in the sharing of relevant decisions, such as investment 
decisions. This cooperation creates an environment that 
encourages the joint pursuit of better performance and 
greater profitability for the whole. However, a poor 
distribution of tasks and gains can easily generate conflict, 
which can destabilize and weaken the arrangement.
TCE evaluates organizational efficiency based on alignment 
between transaction attributes and form of governance, on 
the assumption that the agents have limited reasoning 
ability and are opportunists. The fundamental attributes of 
the transactions are: (1) the specificity of the assets involved; 
(2) uncertainty to which the transactions are subject; and (3) 
the frequency with which the transactions are conducted.
Specific assets have particular purposes which cannot be 
employed in any other way without a considerable loss 
of value (Williamson, 1991). Therefore, the specificity of 
the assets is not the sole determinant, but it is particularly 
important in adopting more cooperative forms of 
governance (Klein, 2008; Macher and Richman, 2008; 
Masten, 2000), which are associated with bilateral 
dependence (Zylbersztajn, 1995). The greater the specificity 
of the assets involved in the production of a good, the 
stronger the incentives to adopt a hybrid form of governance 
or even vertical integration. The specificity of an asset is 
classified into six types: (1) site specificity, when the use 
of an asset in a certain transaction generates savings in 
shipping and storage costs; (2) physical specificity, when 
the assets are designed for a specific purpose (e.g. specific 
inputs for the production of a certain product); (3) human 
specificity, which is based on the idea of ‘learning by doing’; 
(4) dedicated assets, when specific investments are made 
for a particular purpose, for a certain client; (5) brand name 
capital; and (6) temporal specificity (Williamson, 1989).
In agriculture, the specificities most important to the assets 
are site, physical and temporal. This last one, in general, 
is the result of perishability and climactic conditions that 
influence the quantity and quality of agricultural products 
(Raynaud et al., 2009). Another type of specificity comprises 
investments in knowledge, processes and equipment with 
a view to reducing variability in product quality. A number 
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of empirical studies in agriculture bear out the connection 
between asset specificity and tight vertical coordination. 
These include: Mondelli and Klein’s (2014) analysis of 
the use of external equity finance by firms in agricultural 
production; Guo and Jolly’s (2008) evaluation of the 
relationship between contractual arrangements and their 
enforcement in Chinese agriculture; Mello and Paulillo’s 
(2010) analysis of the organizational arrangements between 
farmers and processors in the Brazilian citrus industry; 
Banterle and Stranieri’s (2008) investigation on the effects 
of voluntary traceability on vertical relationships within the 
beef chain in Italy; Mondelli and Zylbersztajn’s (2008b) 
study of contractual arrangements among Uruguayan beef 
producers and processors; Zylbersztajn and Miele’s (2005) 
assessment of the contracts between wineries and grape 
growers in Brazil; Martinez’s (2002) comparison of vertical 
coordination in the U.S. poultry, egg and pork industries; 
and Globerman and Schwindt’s (1986) investigation of 
determinants of vertical integration in the Canadian forest 
products sector.
Uncertainty introduces disturbances that affect the exchange 
process. Uncertainty can be both primary – when it is the 
result of random behaviour and unpredictable changes – 
and secondary – when derived from the fact that decision 
makers are unaware of the intentions of the other party 
(Williamson, 1985). The degree of inherent uncertainty in 
a transaction is another important determinant of the type 
of governance adopted. In fact, transactions that occur in a 
predictable environment are less complex than transactions 
carried out in a more uncertain environment and, therefore, 
more susceptible to unexpected changes. The greater the 
chances of unpredictable changes, the greater the need 
for the introduction of adaptation clauses in a contract, 
the greater possibility of there being gaps and the greater 
the potential for opportunistic actions, which would thus 
raise transaction costs. A highly uncertain environment can 
therefore lead to the adoption of a hierarchical form of 
governance in a transaction.
The frequency with which the relationship between 
the parties is established is another dimension of the 
transaction. This attribute is important because the more 
often a transaction is repeated, the greater the possibility 
of diluting the costs of adopting a complex governance 
mechanism. In this case, a reputation based upon reciprocity 
between the parties can be built.
Based on an alignment between the attributes of the 
transaction (asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency) 
and the governance structure adopted, an evaluation of 
the organizational efficiency becomes possible. A poorly 
chosen governance structure or one poorly adapted to the 
transaction leads to coordination difficulties.
3. Governance structures in finished cattle 
transactions
The finished cattle market in Brazil has been traditionally 
characterized by a predominance of spot market transactions. 
The Brazilian cattle farmer is a price taker in the market and, 
generally, trades the animals on the spot market, where there 
is no commitment to a continued relationship (Pigatto, 
2001; Vinholis, 2001). Pitelli (2004) verified that most 
acquisitions of finished cattle for slaughter occurred through 
the spot market. However, verticalization of production 
has grown due to the establishment of farms belonging 
to large meat processing companies. By internalizing part 
of the production process, the meat processing company 
reduces information problems and the costs of measuring 
characteristics of the experiential goods, in addition to 
considerably increasing control over the quality of the raw 
material, thus reducing transaction costs.
More recently, new cattle commercialization methods have 
emerged as a way of serving market niches. As Brazilian beef 
has gained market share abroad, coordination has become 
a strategic issue of major importance for this industry. 
Accordingly, the use of forward contracts between cattle 
farmers and meat processing plants has also risen (Carrer 
et al., 2011). For the cattle farmer, a forward contract allows 
technical and financial scheduling of production and 
mitigates the uncertainty from the specificity of the asset 
and the risk of price, ensuring the sale at a known price 
and encouraging investments to improve the production 
process with possible gains in quality and productivity. For 
the meat processing plants, the forward contract ensures a 
supply of raw material with pre-established standards of 
quality and enables better planning and control of supply 
and production with consequent gains in competitiveness 
and coordination. Table 1 summarizes the structures of 
governance found in the beef cattle supply chain in Brazil.
4. Hypotheses
The objective of this section is to present the hypotheses for 
the role of asset specificity, frequency of transactions and 
uncertainty in the adoption of hybrid forms of governance 
in the finished cattle market. These hypotheses are presented 
in three subsections, and are associated with the influence 
exercised by these three characteristics of transaction, 
according to the theoretical framework presented.
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Specificity of assets
The specificity of the assets used in the production of 
finished cattle in Brazil has increased due to the adoption 
of highly capital-intensive production systems, as well as the 
adoption of traceability systems. In the Central-West region 
of the country, more intensive production systems have 
spread due to deficient infrastructure that restricts access to 
cheaper land on the agricultural frontier, as well as growing 
restrictions imposed by environmental legislation on the use 
of these lands (Correa et al., 2000). These barriers restrict 
the adoption of systems based on the use of large tracts of 
pasture and low density of animals per hectare of land. 
In the Southeast region, particularly in São Paulo, rising 
land prices and competition from other more profitable 
agricultural crops have contributed to the spread of more 
capital-intensive production systems (Souza Filho et al., 
2010). However, intensive production systems do allow for 
the raising of animals whose meat has the tenderness and 
flavour that are valued by some segments of the market, for 
example, barbecue restaurants and supermarkets located 
in high income areas and some export markets. Obtaining 
these characteristics in the final product depends on a set of 
factors, which include the animal’s genetics, the production 
system and industrial processes. Cattle farmers who rear 
animals with these characteristics, in general, adopt fattening 
systems in confinement and produce a superior product.
The intensification of the use of inputs increases the risk 
and complexity of the production system. The cost structure 
is altered and requires greater disbursement of financial 
resources for the adoption of the technological package. This 
situation requires stricter production management, without 
which the profitability of the system would be compromised 
(Correa et al., 2000). Precise control of inventory and 
production costs determines the success of the more 
intensive production systems, which require more highly 
skilled labour. In addition to investment in the training of 
employees, the highly intensive production system requires 
specific physical investments, for example, the construction 
of silos, pens or rotational grazing infrastructure to fatten 
the animals and electronic scales. Strict control over weight 
gain and time for slaughter of the animals is key to the 
success of the activity. The marginal cost increases at a 
higher rate when the bovine reaches its optimum weight. 
Generally, the metabolism of a bovine with 270 kilos of 
Table 1. Governance structures identified in finished cattle transactions in Brazil.
Governance structure Description
Spot market Both meat processing company and cattle farmer are separate legal entities. There is no commitment 
to continue the relationship with a particular buyer. The negotiation of the price and the number of 
animals occurs sometime near the delivery date. There is no interdependence between the parties.
Relational contract 
(hybrid form)
Due to the trust established between the parties, a credible informal agreement (Hendrikse, 2003) can 
be negotiated between them. Both are separate legal entities. The scale of the delivery of the animals 
to the slaughterhouse units is established before the fattening phase on farms, with the number of 
animals and the delivery date pre-established. Price is determined by market quotation on the delivery 
date for the animals, and is established based on the ESALQ/BM&F index. Payment of a premium for 
quality and traceability can also be agreed upon. Reputation is responsible for mitigating opportunistic 
actions.
Forward contract 
(hybrid form)
This is a formal contract between the cattle farmer and the meat processing company, which maintain 
their status as separate legal entities. Pre-established in the contract are: future delivery date of the 
animals, number, weight, age, sex, in addition to the price per carcass weight in arrobas (1 arroba = 15 
kg). The ESALQ/BM&F1 index is used for this last calculation, to which a premium can be added. This 
premium is determined depending on the demand and supply for quality and/or traceable animals. 
There are also contractual fines if one of the parties breaches the terms of the contract (Carrer et al., 
2014).
Vertical integration Both meat processing plant and cattle farmer are part of the same legal entity. The transaction 
is internalized in the company. The meat processing plant has its own confinement farms for the 
production of animals that meet the specific characteristics required by certain market segments.
1 ESALQ = Escola Superior de Agricultura Luiz de Queiroz (Luiz de Queiroz College of Agriculture); BM&F = Bolsa de Mercadorias 
e Futuro (The Commodities & Futures Exchange).
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weight, or more, shifts to deposition of fat at the expense 
of protein deposition (Owens et al., 1993), resulting in 
loss of economic efficiency. In this case, the deposition 
of fat tissue (high fat) is 2.5 times more energy-inefficient 
than the deposition of muscle tissue (protein rich), as 
adipose tissue and muscle tissue have respectively about 
10 and 78% water in their compositions. Moreover, the 
abdominal adipose tissue is removed during the slaughter 
and its weight is discounted in the payment received by 
the farmer.  Therefore, more capital-intensive livestock 
production systems are characterized by greater physical 
and temporal specificity of the assets, when compared with 
rearing systems based on the extensive use of land.
The above temporal and physical specificity of the assets, 
associated with price risk, requires more planning and 
involves the adoption of management technologies and 
associated information technologies. This is the case for 
famers who are capable of rearing livestock to produce beef 
accepted by the European Union (EU). The diffusion of 
new legal rules and certification systems related to food 
safety and food quality in international trade is increasingly 
determining market access in high value chains (Kariuki et 
al., 2012). The EU has demanded traceability as a condition 
for market access. This demand has had an impact on the 
national regulatory environment for food safety. In 2002, 
the Brazilian System of Identification and Certification of 
Bovine and Bubaline Origin (SISBOV) was created. In 2011, 
the SISBOV certification was a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition to be allowed to export to the EU market. The 
farm also had to acquire TRACES (Trade Control and Expert 
System) certification. TRACES is a veterinary health network 
created by the EU which notifies, certifies and monitors 
trade in animals and animal products. However, the level 
of adoption of SISBOV certification is still low among 
Brazilian farms. A small number of farms have adopted 
this certification, but technological heterogeneity persists 
in bovine livestock production in Brazil.
Certification of the rural property in SISBOV assumes the 
adoption of operational and management technology for 
food safety in livestock rearing. Specific investments in 
operational training, documentation and auditing of the 
traceability system are incorporated. Investment in training 
is carried out, generally, through the ‘learning by doing’ 
approach. In addition to this initial cost, the certification 
process incurs other costs, including inspections and audits 
of the system and a fee per animal to be entered in the 
system. The incorporation of traceability prompts the 
adoption of information technology, such as electronic ear 
tags, optical readers and software for managing and issuing 
inventory reports and forms. These investments therefore 
can increase the specificity of the assets, considering the 
human, physical and dedicated specificities.
On the other hand, the cattle farmer that invests in SISBOV 
certification and in the necessary assets expects that he 
will receive a premium above the market price for these 
animals. According to Kariuki et al. (2012), the compliance 
with third-party certification schemes might be motivated 
by higher or more stable product prices. However, this 
premium price varies according to the supply and demand 
of animals traced according to this certification. Therefore, 
there is uncertainty about their worth. In addition to this 
uncertainty, and the economic risk associated with it, there 
are also significant uncertainties regarding the institutional 
environment. These uncertainties arise from the frequent, 
often unexpected, changes in regulations that determine 
the ‘rules of the game’ for the adoption of the traceability 
system and certification.
TCE assumes the agents involved in the transaction will 
behave in an opportunistic manner. The possibility of post-
contractual opportunism associated with investments in 
specific assets leads the agents to anticipate and mitigate 
post-contractual problems, by drafting precautionary 
measures as a way of ensuring appropriate returns on the 
investments made. Zylbersztajn (2005) cites as an example 
the possibility of earning quasi-rents when a cattle farmer, 
in order to meet the demand of a meat processing plant, 
makes investments in assets with a level of specificity above 
zero. A price P is determined or expected before investments 
are made. In the absence of safeguards, the cattle farmer will 
be exposed to the possibility of opportunistic behaviour; 
i.e. there is a risk in receiving – a posteriori – a lower price 
than that agreed to or expected, that covers their fixed costs, 
but does not provide the desired return. If this occurs, the 
difference is settled by the meat processing plant. Formal 
and informal institutional arrangements, supported by a 
long-term relationship, are mechanisms designed to ensure 
the expected return. In the case of beef cattle, one of the 
ways of safeguarding and mitigating uncertainty about 
receiving premiums is through a forward contract with 
the meat processing plant. This mechanism has grown in 
importance in the industry and can include a clause relating 
to a premium for a traced and certified animal.
In view of the above, the joint adoption of capital-intensive 
production systems and SISBOV certification implies 
investments in specific assets and, therefore, the need to 
adopt hybrid forms of commercialization. In this sense, the 
following hypothesis can be formulated:
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H1:  The joint adoption of capital-intensive production systems 
and SISBOV certification increases the specificity of the 
assets and, therefore, the probability of the adoption of hybrid 
forms of commercialization for finished cattle.
Frequency
The attribute frequency is not dealt with directly in 
the model by Williamson, but its effects are related to 
reputation. On the one hand, recurring transactions enable 
the development of reputation and a relationship of greater 
trust between the agents (Rodrigues and Moraes, 2005). On 
the other hand, the more transactions there are, the greater 
the need for contractual safeguards to deal with unexpected 
events resulting from contractual incompleteness and 
opportunistic actions (Williamson, 1985). Therefore, a 
positive relation between the frequency of the transaction 
and the adoption of closer contractual arrangements is 
expected.
In the Brazilian beef cattle market, transactions between 
cattle farmers and meat processing plants are recurrent. 
Informal relationships, based on trust between the cattle 
farmer and the purchaser, or the broker for the meat 
processing company, predominate (Pitelli, 2004). To meet 
the requirements of some segments of the beef cattle market, 
the meat processing plant selects certain cattle farmers. For 
this selection, information obtained from the history of the 
relationship with the supplying cattle farmers is used. In this 
way, the frequency of the transactions between the cattle 
farmers and the meat processing plant can be empirically 
measured by the number of years the trade relationship has 
been maintained.
H2:  The higher the transaction frequency between the parties, the 
greater the probability that hybrid forms of commercialization 
for finished cattle will be adopted.
Uncertainty
Uncertainty is another transaction dimension in the model 
by Williamson (1985). The principal uncertainties in the 
production and commercialization of finished cattle 
are related to quality and price. The quality of the beef 
is an attribute made up of various factors, including the 
genetics of the cattle, age at slaughter and the production 
system. When the meat processing plant wants to reduce 
uncertainties related to the quality attributes of finished 
cattle, it can rely on information obtained from the history 
of the relationship with the cattle farmers. In this way, 
the meat processing plant will select those cattle farmers 
that, with greater frequency, deliver animals that have the 
desired characteristics, enabling them to establish relational 
contracts.
Another uncertainty in the transactions between the cattle 
farmer and meat processing plants comes from the variation 
in finished cattle prices, as well as the variation in prices for 
9 and 18-month-old calves for fattening. The relationship 
between these two prices establishes the cattle/calf exchange 
ratio, which is an important economic indicator for cattle 
farmers that specialize in the fattening phase of cattle 
production.1 For Arieira et al. (2007), the price of the calf 
for fattening represents an important part of the production 
costs in systems dedicated solely to the fattening of animals. 
Calves for fattening represent around 70% of the operational 
expenses of confinement. Cattle farmers that specialize 
only in the fattening phase use the spot market as a form 
of governance to meet their needs for calves. In this case, 
profitability depends largely on the exchange ratio, which 
varies according to the behaviour of either the finished 
cattle market or the spot market for calves. With a very tight 
profit margin in these production systems, small variations 
in this relationship can significantly affect the indicators of 
economic viability. However, there are producers of finished 
cattle that internalize, totally or partially, their needs for 
calves for fattening. In this last case, verticalization allows 
them to offset the impact of the changes in spot market 
prices for calves. In fact, their costs are associated with their 
own management efficiency and the prices of necessary 
inputs for the creation and maintenance of pastures. 
Therefore, it is assumed that cattle farmers who are more 
dependent on the supply of third parties for their calf needs 
are more subject to abrupt changes in their profit margins 
than cattle farmers who adopt hierarchy as their form of 
governance to meet their needs for calves.
The present article will therefore use the percentage of 
animals (backgrounding cattle) acquired from third parties 
for the fattening phase as a proxy for the measurement of 
uncertainty. It is assumed that uncertainty increases as the 
percentage of backgrounding cattle acquired from third 
parties rises.
1 In Brazil, the cattle production cycle is traditionally composed of 
three production phases: pre-weaning, post-weaning and finishing. 
These phases can be carried out separately on different farms or on 
the same farm. The pre-weaning phase requires the largest amount 
of land per animal. Therefore this phase is normally carried out in 
regions where the land cost is lower. The finishing phase, on the 
other hand, can be more capital intensive and requires less area 
per animal;  it is therefore economically viable in regions where 
the cost of land is higher.
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H3:  The higher the uncertainty, the higher the probability that 
a hybrid form of commercialization of finished cattle will 
be adopted.
5. Method
A survey questionnaire was used with a sample of farmers 
in order to collect information on transactions, adoption 
of certifications, production system, size of the farm, 
relationship with the meat processing plant, income and 
calf purchase. Interviews were carried out personally with 
farm owners from February to August 2011, the average 
interview lasting two hours. Cross-section data was collected 
on 84 farms located in the livestock production region 
of the state of São Paulo, from which 32 certified farms 
were randomly selected from a set of 137 farms certified 
to export beef to the EU, and 52 non-certified nearby 
farms randomly selected from a list of non-certified farms 
obtained from records of farmers associations and rural 
unions. Three criteria were used in the selection: certified 
and non-certified farms must be in the same production 
region; livestock must be the major economic activity on 
the farm; and the farm must perform the fattening phase 
of cattle rearing (though not exclusively). These criteria 
eliminated two farms from the total of 86 initially visited. 
As stated in the SISBOV regulation, the cattle must stay for 
a minimum of 90 days in a zone qualified for export and 
40 days in the last certified farm prior to slaughter. Thus, the 
great incentive for certification adoption is on the finishing 
phase of cattle rearing. This sampling technique lowers the 
cost of the survey and reduces the scope for discriminating 
farms in terms of their environmental characteristics (soil 
types, topography, water supply and climate).
The analysis of the survey data was performed with the 
estimation of a discrete choice logit model. This model has 
also been used in other empirical analyses on the alignment 
between transaction attributes and governance structures 
(Mello and Paulillo, 2010; Mondelli and Zylbersztajn, 
2008a). The variable to be ‘explained’ is the dichotomous 
choice: 1 = adoption of hybrid forms (relational contracts 
and forward contracts, as stated in Table 1); 0 = adoption 
of spot market.
In making the decision on whether or not to adopt the 
hybrid forms, it may be assumed that the farmer weighs the 
marginal advantages and disadvantages of the arrangement. 
As the parameters of this decision are not readily observable, 
for each farmer i we can define a latent variable, y*, as:
yi
* = β’Xi + ui    i = 1, …, N  (1)
where X denotes a set of explanatory variables. The observed 
pattern of governance choice can be described by a dummy 
variable, y, such that yi=1 if farmer i adopts hybrid form, 
yi=0 if he/she works in the spot market. These observed 
values of y are related to y* as follows:
yi = 1  if yi* > 0 (2)
yi = 0  otherwise
and
Pr(yi = 1) = Pr(yi
* > 0) = Pr(ui > -β’Xi) = 1 – F(-β’Xi) = F(β’Xi) (3)
where F is the cumulative distribution function for u and 
a symmetric distribution is assumed. Using maximum 
likelihood procedures, estimates of the β parameters can 
be obtained. For the logit model, a logistic cumulative 
distribution function is assumed,
                    eβXPr(yi = 1) = 
            = Λ(β’X) (4)
                  1 + eβX
where Λ denotes the logistic cumulative distribution 
function.
Here, the ‘odds ratios’ (or eβ) rather than the β coefficients 
themselves are presented. The interpretation is that as the 
explanatory variables change, the probability of farmers 
adopting the hybrid forms changes by that factor. In other 
words, variables with an odds ratio greater than unity would 
increase the probability of use of hybrid forms, while those 
with a value of less than unity would have a negative impact 
on hybrid form adoption.
6. Results
The definitions of the variables used in the model to test 
hypotheses on the adoption of hybrid forms are presented 
in Table 2. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a farmer 
adopts either relational or forward contracts, which are 
assumed to be hybrid forms of governance; and it is equal 
to zero if the spot market is adopted. All individuals of the 
sample fall into these two categories. In the spot market, 
farmers negotiate their cattle a number of days, generally 
a week, before delivery. The price is determined in this 
negotiation. The identity of the parties is not relevant and 
the relationships are sporadic, without any commitment 
to repeating the transaction in the future. Among the 
hybrid forms, we found the use of the relational contract, 
where trust between the parties is based upon a long-term 
relationship. The forward contract is used in transactions 
that occur over a pre-established period of time, in which 
the relationships are characterized by regular transaction 
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volumes, consistency in the quality of the product and by 
prices based on future quotes on stock exchanges or spot 
quotes upon delivery of the animals.
Out of a total of 84 cattle farmers in the sample, 60 of them 
operated exclusively in the spot market. The other 24 cattle 
farmers operated using hybrid forms of commercialization. 
Of these, 10 cattle farmers worked exclusively with forward 
contracts and the other 9 negotiated over half of the volume 
of their herds through forward contracts and the rest on the 
spot market. Another three cattle farmers traded exclusively 
through relational contracts while another two traded using 
both relational contracts and the spot market.
Table 3 shows the results of the logit model.2 The likelihood 
ratio (LR) was used to test the hypothesis that all the slope 
2 Estimations were made using Statistica 10.0.
coefficients in the logit model are zero. The restricted log 
likelihood value is -50.2546. The unrestricted log likelihood 
value is -32.8578. The LR test statistics are therefore 34.79. 
With four degrees of freedom, the critical value at the 5% 
significance level is 14.86, and so the joint hypothesis that 
the coefficients on the full set of variables are all zero is 
rejected.
The interpretation of odds ratios (eβ) can be made using 
the formula [(eβ–1)×100], which shows the change in 
percentage points in the probability of the dependent 
variable to be equal to 1 (adoption of hybrid governance) 
as a response to the change of one unit in the independent 
variable. The results of the estimated parameters of the 
model for asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty are 
in agreement with the theory. These parameters had the 
Table 2. Definition of variables.
Variable Proxy Description
Dependent Hybrid forms (relational and forward contracts) = 1, = 0 spot market
Asset specificity Feedlot and certification Adoption of feedlot as the production system and SISBOV 
certification and = 1, = 0 otherwise
Frequency Meat processing plant relationship Years of relationship with the meat processing plant 
Uncertainty Purchase by third party Percentage of purchase of third-party calves for the feedlot
Size Farm size Total number of hectares
SISBOV = Brazilian System of Identification and Certification of Bovine and Bubaline Origin.
Table 3. Logit model estimation.
Number of objects=84
Chi2(4)=34.7948
Log-likelihood=-32.8578
Nagelkerke R2=0.4860
Variables1 Odds ratio Standard error Wald statistics P
Intercept 0.4042 0.7409 1.4950 0.2214
Asset specificity*
Feedlot and certification* 4.4685 0.4417 11.4889 0.0007
Frequency
Slaughterhouse relationship 1.0160 0.0455 0.1220 0.7269
Uncertainty
Purchase of third-party 1.4042 0.7683 0.1952 0.6586
Size** 1.0001 0.0001 6.4389 0.0112
Correct prediction: 79.59%
1 * = significant at 1% level; ** = significant at 5% level.
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expected sign. However, only asset specificity, measured 
by the adoption of feedlot as the production system to 
fatten cattle and SISBOV certification, was statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Thus, hypothesis 1 is accepted. 
The variable for asset specificity has the greatest impact on 
the probability that farmers will adopt hybrid governance. 
The odds of adopting the hybrid structure significantly 
increases when farmers rear cattle using a feedlot system 
and adopt the SISBOV certification. In fact, a highly capital-
intensive production system requires specific investments, 
such as facilities and human resources. The time for selling 
cattle is restricted; otherwise profits could fall. In order 
to mitigate the uncertainty and price risk associated with 
these investments, farmers adopt forward contracts. The 
SISBOV certification also requires specific investments in 
training and information technology equipment, besides 
the investment made in learning the certification process 
and the start-up costs. In order to ensure the premium 
price payment for traced animals, farmers can include a 
specific contractual clause. It is a mechanism to ensure the 
appropriation of quasi-rent arising from the investments 
made in implementing traceability and obtaining 
certification. This result corroborates the proposal forwarded 
by Williamson (1989) in which the high specificity of the 
assets leads to the adoption of closer forms of coordination. 
The empirical study of Banterle and Stranieri (2008) 
revealed that voluntary adoption of traceability labelling 
system has led to asset specificity increases in the Italian 
meat chain. As a consequence, vertical agreements among 
the agents were strengthened. Mora and Menozzi (2005) 
also observed that the adoption of traceability, fostered by 
European regulations, narrowed vertical relationships in the 
Italian beef production chain.
The percentage of animals acquired from third parties for 
the fattening phase was used as a proxy for uncertainty. 
This is based on the assumption that cattle farmers that 
are more dependent on the supply of third parties for 
their backgrounding cattle for fattening needs are subject 
to strong fluctuations in the economic viability of their 
business due to changes in the finished cattle/calf exchange 
ratio. This type of economic risk is not faced by cattle 
farmers that internalize part, or all, of backgrounding cattle 
production. The parameter estimated for this variable was 
not statistically significant in the logit model. As a result, it 
was not possible to accept the hypothesis of the alignment 
of this transaction attribute with the form of governance, 
considering this variable as a proxy. However, hypothesis 
3 cannot be fully rejected. In fact, other considerations 
regarding uncertainty must be taken into account, for 
example, the impact of institutional environments of high 
or low uncertainty with regard to price. It was not possible 
to carry out this type of evaluation based on the current 
sample of cattle farmers, since all of the individuals are 
subject to the same institutional environment. Here, the 
possible conclusion is that this source of uncertainty is not 
sufficient to promote hybrid governance in the transactions 
between meat processing plants and cattle farmers.
The frequency with which the relationship between the 
parties is established is another transaction attribute. The 
parameter estimated for this variable was not statistically 
significant, despite signs indicating the expected effect 
on the mechanisms of governance adopted. Therefore, 
hypothesis 2 was also not proven.
Farm area was used as a proxy for size and is statistically 
significant at a level of 5%. The odds ratio of size shows 
that adoption of hybrid governance significantly increases 
when the total area of farms is higher. In fact, for the meat 
processing plants, establishing contracts with larger cattle 
farmers improves planning for the slaughter/processing 
capacity, enabling the purchase of more standardized 
animals and reducing transaction costs.
7. Final considerations
In general, the production of finished cattle in intensive 
systems, associated with the need for traceability certification 
for the European market, involves investments in specific 
assets and, consequently, the need for hybrid forms of 
coordination that ensure the earning of quasi-rents due 
to the specificity of the assets. In contrast, there are fewer 
requirements in the transactions that involve the sale of 
untraced cattle and production can be carried out in less 
intensive systems that do not adopt traceability. In this case, 
the specificity of the assets is lower, making contracts or 
closer relations between the parties unnecessary, since the 
cattle farmer has more options for buyers in the market, 
without running the risk of a loss in value.
From the perspective of the meat processing companies, 
the need to ensure a certain level of regularity and volume 
of animals to serve their foreign market makes contractual 
governance a relatively strategic option. However, to meet the 
needs of less demanding markets, the purchase of animals 
on the spot market is perfectly adequate, considering the 
risks that the meat market offers at the end of the chain.
These results have implications for organizations in the 
beef industry as well as policy makers in terms of strategies 
focused on higher quality beef products. Traceability can 
provide direct production management benefits. It allows 
for improvements in the whole production chain, as better 
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information systems and production controls are adopted. 
Identification and communication of potential issues 
becomes more efficient and the costs of recall in the event 
of food contamination can be reduced.
It was found that the forms of governance employed to 
coordinate transactions between cattle farmers and meat 
processing plants are aligned with the principal attribute 
of governance proposed by Williamson (1985): asset 
specificity. This indicates that the farmers were able to 
measure the transaction characteristics and choose more 
efficient solutions in order to minimize them and ensure 
the appropriation of part of the gains arising from specific 
investments.
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